Civil disobedience, costly signals, and leveraging injustice by Lai, Ten-Herng
 1 
Civil disobedience, costly signals, and leveraging injustice 
Accepted (May. 29, 2020) for publication in Ergo. 
penultimate draft 
Ten-Herng LAI 





Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the 
duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, ad-
hering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience 
may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedi-
ence. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily 
functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by being costly, and 
costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil 
disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their 
communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of 
the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state 
may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. 
Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render un-
civil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedi-
ence—potentially permissible. 
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Civil disobedience, costly signals, and leveraging injustice 
Many of those who have engaged in civil disobedience have faced legal punishment: leaders 
of the Hong Kong Occupy Central, Black Lives Matter activists, Occupy Wall Street partici-
pants, Civil Rights activists, Henry D. Thoreau, and as some have argued, Antigone of Thebes 
(Daube 2011; Tiefenbrun 1999). But there seems to be something deeply problematic about 
the treatment these civil disobedients have received. Many of them have sought to bring forth 
much needed political change without violating the demands of morality (Brownlee 2012; Ce-
likates 2016a; Markovits 2005; Rawls 1999; W. Smith 2013). Imposing such harsh sanctions 
seems a poor way of repaying those who have fought for racial, gender, social and economic 
equality and against unjust wars and tyranny, especially when these problems persist pre-
cisely because ordinary citizens and the state did nothing to prevent, and even actively played 
a role in perpetuating, the injustices in question and, hence, made civil disobedience neces-
sary in the first place. In light of these considerations, it may seem obviously true that when 
civil disobedience is justified, punishment is inapt. Indeed, the High Court of Taiwan has 
found the leaders of the Sunflower Movement—the 2014 mass civil disobedience—“not guilty 
on the basis that their actions were justified civil disobedience.”1 Surely, this is the model we 
should strive to adopt.2 
That being said, I shall argue that the claim that the state should refrain from punish-
ing justified acts of civil disobedience turns out to have certain implications that are surpris-
ing in themselves. The central idea is that punishment plays an indispensable role in 
 
1 Hioe, B. (14 March 2018). Not Guilty Verdict Upheld for Sunflower Movement Protesters 
after Appeal by Prosecutors. New Bloom. https://newbloommag.net/2018/03/14/second-rul-
ing-sunflower/ See also Jones and Su (2017) for a democratic confrontational argument for 
the justifiability of the Sunflower Movement, and a democratic harmony argument against 
punishment. 
2 Some go a step further and argue that regardless of whether civil disobedience is justified, 
it ought not to be punished merely because of its illegality, as there’s a moral right to civil 
disobedience, either grounded on the right to conscience (Brownlee 2012, 2018) or the right to 
political participation (Lefkowitz 2007, 2018). I will engage with these possibilities later in the 
paper. 
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contributing to civil disobedience’s overall ability to serve as a costly signal: one that allows 
civil disobedients to distinguish themselves from speakers who lack the relevant sincerity 
and seriousness, which in turn constitutes the reliability and effectiveness of their commu-
nicative act. Without punishment, the effectiveness of civil disobedience is compromised. 
Spelling out this unfortunate consequence will help us better understand the nature of civil 
disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their 
communicative force. This will lead to two further implications. First, the moral status of civil 
disobedience and punishing it appear to be unstable: refraining from punishing civil disobe-
dience may render civil disobedience ineffective, and thus unjustified, and thus liable to be 
punished; but punishing civil disobedience can make civil disobedience effective, and thus 
justified, and thus not liable to be punished. Here, the requirements of justice may generate 
an impossibility where under specific circumstances, the state is left with no morally accepta-
ble course of actions. Second, the state may render uncivil disobedience justified by adhering 
to a requirement of justice, namely, to not punish justified civil disobedience. 
The paper is in four sections. Section 1 provides an argument for the claim that the 
state should refrain from punishing justified acts of civil disobedience. Section 2 discusses 
the key claim that civil disobedience functions as a costly social signal and explains how 
punishment is vital for it to do so. Section 3 spells out the problematic implications. Section 
4 briefly spells out a further troublesome implication for anyone who endorses the right to 
civil disobedience. 
1. The injustice of punishing justified civil disobedience 
Civil disobedience may be defined as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act con-
trary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the 
government” (Rawls 1999: 320).3 The legitimate targets of civil disobedience are the nontrivial 
 
3 There have been reasonable attempts to expand the notion of civil disobedience. However, 
insofar as civil disobedience is understood as a communicative act, the definition doesn’t 
have much implications on this paper. 
 4 
flaws in the law or other social institutions. These flaws may be severe injustices (Rawls 
1999), that the public in general ignores the voices of the marginalized and certain important 
considerations (Markovits 2005; W. Smith 2011, 2013), or that the system and laws came into 
existence through a process that lacks political legitimacy (Simmons 2010). A particular act 
of civil disobedience is justified when performed as a last resort and shows reasonable pro-
spects of success to address these flaws, and furthermore display a willingness for future 
cooperation through accepting punishment and insisting upon nonviolence (Sabl 2001). De-
spite being illegal, civil disobedience does not violate the presumed duty to obey the law when 
it serves as the last resort to remedy severe injustices or democratic failures. In such cases, 
the moral considerations that normally demand obedience instead support fixing the law 
through civil disobedience (Delmas 2014a, 2014b; Markovits 2005; W. Smith 2011, 2013). 
Civil disobedience is illegal, and illegal activities that are caught are normally pun-
ished. But is the state justified in punishing justified civil disobedience—activities that are so 
very distinct from “ordinary offending” (Brownlee 2012)? To properly answer this question, 
we need to bear in mind that punishment itself requires moral justification, as “[p]unishment 
is probably the most awful thing that modern democratic states systematically do to their 
own citizens” (Tadros 2011: 1). We need to closely examine what potentially justifies punish-
ment, and see whether those justifications apply to punishing justified instances of civil dis-
obedience. Here I will primarily focus on the fair play theory, as it provides a unified account 
of why we have a duty to obey, why illegal activities normally warrant punishment, and how 
civil disobedience can be justified. All these will add up to the conclusion that civil disobedi-
ence, if justified, ought not to be punished. I will then briefly consider other theories of pun-
ishment and the possibility that punishing civil disobedience can be justified on special con-
siderations. 
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1.1 The fair play theory 
The basic idea of the fair play theory of political obligation is that when people voluntarily 
benefit from a cooperative scheme, they have a duty to do their fair share in contributing to 
the cooperative scheme (Hart 1955; Klosko 2004). Enjoying the fruits of the cooperative 
scheme but refraining to contribute is free riding. While free riding does not necessarily 
threaten the efficiency or stability of the cooperative scheme (though it sometimes does), it 
involves a form of “unfair self-selection” (Simmons 2001: 30) or “objectionably preferential 
treatment” (Cullity 1995: 22) to oneself, and is thus morally dubious. 
When the law is sufficiently just, a duty of fair play is present and grounds the pro 
tanto duty to obey the law. This is because the law specifies the terms of a fair cooperative 
scheme under which all citizens benefit. There may be different ways to understand the ben-
efits this cooperative scheme provides. For example, it can be the most efficient way individ-
uals can rescue each other from the threat of the state of nature (Wellman 2005), or to safe-
guard the rule of law—that which enables individuals to exercise their individual autonomy 
(Dagger 1997; Moraro 2019; Raz 1986). In virtue of benefiting from this cooperative scheme, 
individuals acquire a fair play duty to obey. Refusing to obey the law constitutes a pro tanto 
wrong by accumulating an unfair advantage: enjoying the benefits but not doing one’s fair 
share. 
This leads to the grounds of punishment. When an individual hoards an unfair ad-
vantage, fairness demands that the unfair advantage be relinquished. It is the business of the 
state to get back from the perpetrator through inflicting punishment. “Justice—that is, pun-
ishing such individuals—restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the 
individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt” (Morris 1968: 487). The emphasis here is 
on getting back the unfair advantage. For punishment to be just, the punished must have 
gained unfair benefits. In the following, I will show that despite its illegal nature, sometimes 
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civil disobedience has gained no unfair advantages, and can thereby be justified against both 
the duty to obey and punishment. 
In cases where the law fails to meet the standards of fairness, but rather involves 
exploitative cooperative schemes, those who are on the privileged end of the law no longer 
contribute to and benefit from a fair cooperative scheme. Rather, they are enjoying unfair 
advantages over those who are on the other end of the law. In such cases, Candice Delmas 
(2014a) argues that in order to avoid accumulating unfair advantages, in principle the privi-
leged have three options to fulfil their duty of fair play: “exit, restitution, and radical reform.” 
However, as “[e]xit is often excessively difficult, and is generally undesirable” and “[r]estitu-
tion is often practically impossible, and is generally insufficient” (476), promoting radical re-
form is the only reasonable way to fulfil one’s duty of fair play. When legal methods of pro-
moting radical reform is infeasible, civil disobedience is then sometimes the most fitting way 
to fulfil the duty of fair play. In this way, civil disobedience is justified vis-à-vis the duty to 
obey the law. Here, instead of demanding obedience, the duty of fair play demands civil dis-
obedience. 
Another way to justify civil disobedience on fair play is to point out that those who 
engage in civil disobedience perform an important and essential service to the cooperative 
scheme of the law. Piero Moraro (2019) points out that “cooperative schemes generally involve 
a division of labour, whereby all members must do their part to support the provision of the 
good,” where one crucial way to contribute “involves identifying possible risks that may en-
danger the provision of the good” (302). Legal protests can often perform this important task, 
but they do not always work. In cases where legal protests prove to be futile, civil disobedi-
ence may become the best option to perform this task. Here, despite breaching the law, those 
who engage in civil disobedience do not accumulate any unfair advantage to themselves, but 
instead do their part (and often much more) in the cooperative scheme. Civil disobedients 
normally voluntarily accept additional burdens: the time and effort spent in planning the 
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movement, the hostility from the general public, the risks of facing police brutality, and legal 
punishment and criminal records (306). In comparison to their law-abiding counterparts, 
civil disobedients have incurred no fewer burdens in supporting the cooperative scheme. 
Either way, civil disobedience is justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law when it is 
performed not to acquire unfair advantages over one’s fellow citizens, but to promote much 
needed radical reform or to highlight and resolve severe threats to the cooperative scheme. 
When civil disobedience is thus justified, it is also not the appropriate target of legal punish-
ment. Legal punishment is to balance benefits and burdens through getting back from free 
riders. Actors who engage in justified civil disobedience do not gain unfair advantages, and 
there’s nothing to get back from them. Therefore, punishing justified civil disobedience con-
tradicts the fair play theory: “it would be unfair to impose additional burdens upon them in 
the form of a legal sanction” (Moraro 2019: 306. Italics Original). 
1.2 Other theories 
I acknowledge that there are other plausible theories of the duty to obey. However, similar to 
how fair play can justify civil disobedience, other theories such as those grounded in a natural 
duty of justice (Delmas 2014b; Wellman 2005) or in democratic authority (Markovits 2005; W. 
Smith 2013) allow noticeable space for civil disobedience to be morally justified. The rationale 
is identical to that of the fair play justification. When laws are nontrivially flawed, obedience 
no longer contributes to the realization of the underlying values these theories build upon. 
Instead, sometimes civil disobedience serves as the best way to respond to those underlying 
values, in particular when legal methods prove to be futile and civil disobedience shows rea-
sonable prospects of success. In such cases, civil disobedience is morally justified. 
There are also a number of plausible theories of punishment. While I do not intend to 
exercise each in full detail, similar arguments can be made against punishing justified civil 
disobedience. The plausible theories of punishment converge on a simple common feature 
relevant to our discussion: those who are liable to punishment are those who have engaged 
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in prior wrongdoing. For instance, while deterrence theorists hold that the purpose of pun-
ishment is to deter crime, they hold that only those who have engaged in wrongdoing and 
thus have either acquired an enforceable duty to protect others (Farrell 1985; Tadros 2011) or 
who have forfeited their own rights against harsh treatment can be used as means of deter-
rence (Wellman 2012, 2017). Retributivist hold that wrongdoers deserve suffering and it is 
the business of the state to inflict suffering on, and only on, those who have engaged in 
wrongdoing (Kleinig 2012; Moore 1987). Communicative theorists point out that blame is nec-
essarily expressed through punishment (Duff 2010; Feinberg 1965), and for blame to be apt 
the target of blame must be blameworthy. 
Relevant to civil disobedience, the common implication of these theories is that if an 
act of civil disobedience is justified, then it would be unjust to punish it. If an act of civil 
disobedience is morally justified, disobedients do not commit any type of wrongdoing that 
creates any enforceable duty to protect others, that forfeits one’s right against harsh treat-
ment, that deserves suffering, or that makes one blameworthy. Punishing justified civil diso-
bedience, accordingly, would be punishing those who have not made themselves liable to be 
punished in the ways proposed by these theories of punishment. 
An additional note on blame. In order for the state to appropriately punish, it must 
also have the moral standing to blame. There are many ways people may lose the standing to 
blame, say, if they have committed similar wrongs, or were complicit in or have facilitated 
the wrong in question. Similarly, if the state has failed to protect the rights and interests of 
certain groups, and the disadvantages they suffer put them in difficult situations where ille-
gal activities become serious options, the state loses the authority to punish these people. The 
state is responsible for the plight of the disadvantaged, and is thus at least partially respon-
sible for the crimes the disadvantaged commit. Blaming the disadvantaged through punish-
ment “whilst refusing to answer to [them] for the wrongs that [they have] suffered (and still 
suffer) at our collective hands” (Duff 2010: 139) is illegitimate. This has a further implication 
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on the punishment of civil disobedience. It is often the state’s failure to protect the rights and 
interests of certain groups, or failure to address serious flaws within the system, that made 
civil disobedience a serious option. Thus, within a certain range, even if an instance of civil 
disobedience is not fully justified, it may still be inappropriate for the state to exact punish-
ment. It lacks the proper moral standing, and is as guilty as, if not guiltier than, those who 
have breached the law.  
1.3 Other special considerations in favor of punishment 
But is not civil disobedience special in the sense that those who engage in it must submit 
themselves to punishment? This may generate special considerations that make punishing 
justified civil disobedience permissible. Here I will consider two possibilities: that civil diso-
bedients have consented to be punished; and that we need and can issue a special verdict, 
“guilty but civilly disobedient” (GBCD). 
1.3.1 Consent 
Consent has the moral power to alter normative statuses, typically making otherwise imper-
missible actions permissible. It may be that in virtue of engaging in civil disobedience, diso-
bedients consent to be punished, and in virtue of their consent, punishing civil disobedience 
becomes permissible even if normally it is unjust to punish justified actions. To see whether 
this is correct, we need to go through at least two questions. The first is whether consent has 
really been given. It is not particularly clear that civil disobedients have openly declare some-
thing like “I consent to be punished.” Instead, it might be thought that civil disobedients have 
tacitly given consent to be punished when they have voluntarily breached the law with the 
knowledge that their illegal actions would lead to punishment, and have furthermore sub-
mitted themselves to punishment. 
A complete account of what makes voluntary actions consent-giving is clearly beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, there are certain conditions necessary for consent to be 
valid. The most prominent one is that there must be a reasonable set of options. If an actor 
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chooses among a small set of undesirable options imposed upon her, when eventually one 
option is chosen, it can hardly be said the consequence suffered are morally unproblematic 
because it’s the product of consent. This is essentially how tacit consent theories fail: volun-
tarily remaining in a state does not amount to consenting to the rule of the state, because for 
most people leaving just is not a feasible option (Simmons 2005). Apply this to civil disobedi-
ence. If civil disobedience is justified, it was chosen among a set of undesirable options: suffer 
injustice or disobey. This set of undesirable options was imposed upon the disobedients by 
the negligence or active oppression of the state or the majority. Choosing one or another is in 
no way consent giving; otherwise, those who do not disobey consent to oppression, which is 
absurd. Therefore, civil disobedients normally have not given valid consent to be punished. 
The second question we need to ask is whether consent can fully justify punishment. 
It is debatable whether consent can forfeit each and every right, or whether there are limits 
to consent (Anderson 2000; Baker 2009; Schaber 2020). Relevant to the discussion here, there 
is reason to doubt whether consenting to punishment can make punishment permissible. 
Consider, for example, someone who suffers from extreme poverty or simple boredom, and 
goes to whatever relevant authority, declares that she wants to be punished, to be locked in 
prison either to be fed or experience something new. Either way, it seems highly inappropri-
ate for the state to actually punish that person. There are a few explanations that can capture 
this intuition: that punishment should be reserved for the guilty; that punishment implies 
blame, is apt only towards the blameworthy, and consenting to being blamed cannot make 
one blame worthy; that the state should support this person in more appropriate ways than 
putting her in prison. All these explanations suggest that even if (however unlikely) civil dis-
obedients have given valid consent to be punished, the state still should not punish them. 
1.3.2 “Guilty but civilly disobedient” 
Matthew R. Hall (2006) proposes a special verdict for civil disobedience, what he calls “guilty 
but civilly disobedient” (GBCD). The GBCD verdict is reached when the offenders are found 
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to have breached the law but in a way that meets the standards of civil disobedience: consci-
entiously, openly, respectfully, non-violently, and with minimum force and disruption. The 
verdict allows us “to recognize officially the special status of civil disobedience without hav-
ing to do so in a hidden or backdoor manner” (2116). The merits of having this distinctive 
verdict include properly recognizing the distinction between civil disobedience and ordinary 
offending, satisfying those who believe that civil disobedience is no less of a criminal offence, 
and maintaining the uniformity of law enforcement through punishing offenders. 
An additional appeal of GBCD is that the state can pass sentences on civil disobedi-
ents without the blame normally attached to punishment. This effectively circumvents the 
problem communicative theories present against punishing civil disobedience. Since GBCD 
does not blame, it neither blames the blameless nor has problems with the standing of blame. 
Nevertheless, it still imposes harsh treatment on those who have not made themselves liable 
to or deserving of punishment. Thus, GBCD may be better than merely finding civil disobe-
dience guilty of criminal offences, but falls short of being fully satisfactory. 
In short, civil disobedience may not be special in the relevant way that makes punish-
ment appropriate.  
2. How civil disobedience works 
Punishing justified civil disobedience is unjust. The solution should be simple: the state 
should refrain from punishing justified civil disobedience. By adhering to this demand of 
justice, we may think that we can have the best of both worlds: civil disobedients help the 
society to fix severe injustices, and they no longer receive the harsh and unjust treatment of 
punishment as a “reward” for their work. This picture, however, is too good to be true. We 
shall see this once we properly understand how civil disobedience works as a costly social 
signal. 
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2.1 Civil disobedience as a costly social signal 
The basic idea of costly signals is that there are signals—observable traits other entities can 
alter behavior upon—that the sender actually or potentially incurs nontrivial costs to produce 
(Zahavi 1975). These signals are typically honest—reliable indicators of the unobservable 
traits; for individuals without the relevant unobservable traits cannot afford to produce those 
signals. Paradigm examples include the flamboyant tail of a male peacock, stotting—the high 
jumping of a gazelle when spotting cheetahs, and the begging behavior of chicks. In each case, 
individuals without the underlying traits would not benefit from producing the signals. A 
less than strong and agile male peacock would become easy prey when dragging around such 
an obvious attraction (Zahavi 1975). A gazelle that cannot run away sufficiently fast would 
better start running instead of stotting (Alcock and Rubenstein 2019). A less than hungry 
chick would not benefit as much from being fed for the exhausting intense begging (J. M. 
Smith and Harper 2003). Since the “handicap”—the self-imposed cost—is difficult to fake, it 
prevents dishonesty. Costly signals are thus reliable indicators of unobservable traits. 
Signaling theory is applicable to the social context, and many have employed the no-
tion of costly signals to explain social interactions, for instance, on getting a higher education 
to look more competitive on the job market even if the education is irrelevant to the job 
(Spence 1973), on donation and pro-sociality signaling (Brokensha et al. 2016), on warranty 
and the quality of the product (Cowen and Tabarrok 2015), and on the existence and persis-
tence of certain inefficient honor norms and honor violence (Thrasher and Handfield 2018), 
just to name a few. My aim here is to provide an account of social signaling that explains how 
civil disobedience works. The gist is that civil disobedience is a reliable indicator of issues 
the society should pay more attention to because it is costly, and it is costly primarily because 
it is punished. 
As previously mentioned, even liberal democratic societies suffer from nontrivial 
flaws in their systems. While liberal democratic societies have many mechanisms to detect 
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these flaws, and incorporate several legal channels for citizens to bring forth their cases, a 
number of these flaws remain unresolved by any normal methods. There are a handful of 
explanations for such failures. One plausible explanation, which is also the assumption I 
make in this paper, is that while we are somewhat inclined to act morally when we can easily 
see what morality demands, we are quite good at arranging our surroundings such that we 
do not see what morality demands (Anderson 2010; Dana et al. 2007; Young 2002). Civil diso-
bedience breaches this barrier of (willful) ignorance, draws attention to important issues, and 
thus facilitates political change. 
Civil disobedience is by no means the only channel to do so. People voice their con-
cerns through a variety of methods. We can call or write to our local politicians. We can like 
posts or participate in polls on social media. We can attend rallies and join legal protests. 
While it may seem good that we have such a variety of options, all these different channels 
of political participation also produce a fair amount of “noise:” what has been raised may not 
deserve the attention of the public, but might be trivial concerns that can wait or should be 
entirely ignored. Afterall, nothing prevents those who have trivial or even objectionable de-
mands from employing these methods. Furthermore, public attention may be viewed as a 
scarce resource different groups compete to secure (Markovits 2005; W. Smith 2013). While 
the public may be inclined to focus their attention on urgent and significant issues, they do 
not display the competence to distinguish between the important and trivial cases that are 
brought forward through the variety of channels.  
As a costly signal, civil disobedience stands out, as Leslie G. Jacobs (1998) puts it, as a 
“moral shout” among all the noise. Civil disobedience is publicly and deliberately illegal, and 
many of the disobedients submit themselves to punishment as part of the movement. In this 
way they demonstrate a seriousness and sincerity other less costly means of political partic-
ipation lack. To those who engage in civil disobedience, their case is so important, and fur-
thermore so reasonable, that making the case is worth the costs incurred. They are confident 
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enough that once they draw the attention of the public, there are reasonable prospects that 
others will take them seriously and consider their pleadings so that their self-sacrifice will 
not be in vain. In contrast, those who lack the relevant seriousness and sincerity would be 
unwilling to incur significant costs to make their case. The costs would not be worth it for 
them, either because their case would be quickly dismissed by the public upon closer scru-
tiny, or because even if the action happens to bring about the social change they desire, the 
change itself is not significant enough to outweigh what they have suffered. 
There are many ways to produce costly social signals. The previously mentioned do-
nation, or probably simply spending a large amount of money to purchase advertisement may 
be to some extent effective. However, there is something special about, though not unique to, 
civil disobedience. Unlike spending, which can be costly to most of us but insignificant to the 
affluent, there is something more equal about incurring costs in domains core to human func-
tioning. Regardless of their social or economic status, individuals more or less value their 
own health, life, and freedom equally. It is thus easy to feel how much one has sacrificed 
when one willingly gives up these interests. Furthermore, these interests are for the most part 
non-transferable. Unlike incurring monetary costs, with (probably) rare exceptions, no one 
can sponsor or reimburse the health, life, or freedom of others. This makes the self-sacrifice 
more salient. Just like hunger strikes and in very extreme cases self-immolation, which incur 
costs by sacrificing one’s health and life (and not to mention the excruciating pain suffered), 
civil disobedience incurs cost by sacrificing one’s freedom by being jailed and sometimes 
risking one’s own life when performed in more oppressive regimes. Civil disobedients incur 
certain costs, while others without the relevant sincerity and seriousness steer clear of these 
costs. By speaking in ways others are unwilling to speak, this costly social signal serves as 
reliable indicators for the public to more easily identify what it should pay attention to. Thus, 
civil disobedience is effective by being reliable, reliable by being costly, and costly by being 
punished. 
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This analysis leads us to a serious concern. The effectiveness of civil disobedience as 
a social signal hinges upon being punished. Without punishment, civil disobedience can no 
longer serve as a costly social signal. Without being able to serve as a costly social signal, its 
reliability is greatly diminished, and can no longer achieve the function of the “moral shout” 
that brings worthwhile issues to the attention of the public. Thus, if we intend to refrain from 
treating civil disobedients unjustly by refusing to punish them, we might actually be doing 
them a disfavor. We would effectively disarm social struggles by rendering an otherwise ef-
fective means of protest ineffective. As a matter of fact, ignoring and refusing to arrest activ-
ists is a known strategy government agents employ to trivialize social movements, and “[p]er-
haps only those who have tried unsuccessfully to get arrested can know how frustrating this 
tactic can be” (Edmundson 2007: 58). (The Suffragettes, for example, had to attack and spit at 
the police to provoke arrest (Crawford 2003).) While in comparison, we may have drastically 
different intentions when we advocate against punishment, we may be in effect trivializing 
civil disobedience the same way oppressive government agents refuse to arrest protestors 
and thereby deny protestors the dramatical effect they seek. 
To further the problem, rendering civil disobedience ineffective is highly undesirable. 
Civil disobedience strikes a sweet spot by providing a channel to individuals whose concerns 
were ignored to voice their concerns, so that they will not have to engage in something more 
drastic and disruptive. Should we shut down this channel, we would be putting those in need 
in a difficult position: should they engaging in something more costly to themselves? That is 
hardly attractive to the oppressed. Should they resort to more drastic and disruptive activi-
ties? There may be moral concerns on whether this is acceptable; and even if it is, it seems 
much less desirable compared to less harmful measures. Should they simply give up and re-
main silent? That would leave serious flaws in the society unresolved and demanding the 
oppressed to continue to endure. 
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In all, instead of arriving at a wonderful picture where justice simply prevails, by ad-
hering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing civil disobedience, we inevi-
tably arrive at a rather grim picture. Civil disobedience, an important means of social strug-
gle, is debilitated by our attempt to fulfil an important requirement of justice. 
2.2 Is punishment necessary for effectiveness? 
It may be objected that I have sketched this grim picture too quickly. Perhaps civil disobedi-
ence works differently from what my costly social signal account describes. Here I will con-
sider two alternative possibilities: civil disobedience may work but not as a costly signal; and 
civil disobedience may still be costly even without actually being punished due to the costs 
of trial, arrest, the risk of punishment, and penalties. 
2.2.1 Effective without costs 
There may be an alternative story of how civil disobedience works, one that has nothing to 
do with costs. Perhaps civil disobedience is effective because it draws sufficient attention to, 
and forces the public to consider, previously ignored facts or points of views. Civil disobedi-
ence, after all, is an illegal protest, and is thus quite different from legal protests. Perhaps the 
illegality alone suffices to make the movement salient enough. Civil disobedience is also dis-
ruptive. It sometimes blocks the traffic of the busiest intersections. It sometimes occupies the 
central business districts, governmental buildings, or museums and other tourist attractions. 
These acts are difficult to ignore, will often attract a fair amount of media coverage, and dis-
obedients can take advantage of these opportunities to advertise their cause. Furthermore, 
civil disobedience sometimes does attract a fair number of participants. The sheer numbers 
represent the bargaining power the movement has, and perhaps it is the coercive force the 
numbers represent that brings about social change. 
The mere illegality and the disruption may indeed contribute to the effectiveness of 
civil disobedience. The number of participants may also help. Granted, these factors seem to 
be insufficient to properly explain the success of civil disobedience. Illegality and disruption 
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generate publicity, but publicity alone does not seem to be a decisive factor; otherwise adver-
tisement campaigns that bombard the public with certain messages would probably suffice, 
and there will be no need for large-scale demonstrations. Furthermore, in order to mobilize 
a large enough crowd, civil disobedience needs to first get enough people on board. How that 
is achieved requires additional explanation. If we leave the sincerity and seriousness demon-
strated by the acceptance of punishment out of the picture, it will be more difficult to explain 
how civil disobedience is taken seriously by the public instead of being dismissed as another 
noise in the forum. 
2.2.2 Costly without punishment: arrest and trial 
The costs associated with engaging in illegal activities are not exhausted by punishment. Riot 
police are often armed with batons, tear gas, pepper spray, rubble bullets, and water cannons. 
The arrest disobedients go through is often quite brutal. Standing trial is time consuming. It 
can also be extremely burdensome (financially and otherwise) for those who lack proper legal 
resources. In addition, the uncertainty that lingers through the trial is also quite depressing. 
Furthermore, in certain cases where civil disobedients evade legal punishment, the costs they 
incur may even surpass those who undergo legal punishment, as in the case of Edward Snow-
den, where fleeing the country, being branded a “traitor,” and living the life of an exile is 
sufficiently costly.4 Thus the objection: even without punishment, civil disobedience can still 
be costly enough to be a costly signal. 
However, a few things need to be taken into consideration. First, however costly arrest 
and trial may be, punishment in addition to arrest and trial is always more costly than mere 
arrest and trial. Furthermore, in comparison, punishment is normally the most significant 
portion of the costs. By removing the most significant portion of the costs, there is an unignor-
able risk that the costs would be insufficient for civil disobedience to be a costly signal that 
 
4 There is disagreement on whether whistleblowing in general, or the case of Edward Snow-
den in particular, counts as civil disobedience (Boot 2019; Delmas 2015; Scheuerman 2014). 
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demonstrates sincerity and seriousness. Even if civil disobedience is not thereby rendered 
completely ineffective, it is surely compromised. 
Second, remember that the conclusions we have arrived at through examining the 
theories of punishment is that civil disobedience, if justified, ought not to be punished. This 
is to establish a norm that civil disobedience, if justified, will not be punished. If we institu-
tionalize this norm, then however costly arrest and trial actually are, they will just seem like 
mere routines: civil disobedients are arrested and tried with knowledge that they will not be 
punished. This trivializes the whole act, and will make it harder for civil disobedience to be 
taken seriously. 
Third, it may well be that without punishment civil disobedience is still sufficiently 
costly, because arrest and trial can be extremely costly. However, brutal arrest and overly 
burdensome trial are unjust. If our solution to the effectiveness of civil disobedience hinges 
on these unjust practices, we will be solving one problem by creating another one. To avoid 
the undesirable consequences of adhering to a requirement of justice, we flout another re-
quirement. 
Fourth, the case of Snowden may be more an exception. He would have faced the 
charges under the Espionage Act, which would most likely land him in prison for at least 30 
years, should he have not chosen to flee. The severity of the potential sentences at least par-
tially explains his choice to flee. But in choosing exile, he also suffered extremely burdensome 
personal costs. However, as some (Delmas 2015; Scheuerman 2014) have argued, his act of 
whistleblowing was justified, and the punishment he would have faced would be unjust. If 
the norm of not punishing justified acts of civil disobedience were strictly adhered to, he 
would not have to face the severe unjust punishment, and may not have needed to flee. Thus, 
while it is quite true that Snowden did incur severe costs without punishment, the costs he 
would have suffered if the state adhered to the demands of justice—in this case refraining 
from punishing him—would be significantly different, and presumably much lower. 
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2.2.3 Costly without punishment: the risk of punishment 
In a society where civil disobedience is normally punished, those who engage in civil disobe-
dience will expect to face punishment. Even if some instances of civil disobedience are not 
punished because they are justified, this expectation will still remain. Thus, civil disobedience 
will still be costly without actual punishment, as the risk of being punished is a high enough 
cost. 
At first glance, this might seem plausible. Indeed, if we know that other instances of 
civil disobedience will be punished, and if it’s in our power to decide whether a particular 
instance of justified civil disobedience is to be punished, we should rule against punishment. 
The disobedients have successfully demonstrated their sincerity and seriousness when they 
did what they did in the face of the risk of punishment. However, we are talking about insti-
tutionalizing the treatment of civil disobedience. If we establish a norm that civil disobedi-
ence, if justified, is not to be punished, then insofar as those who engage in civil disobedience 
are confident that they will be judged as justly breaching the law, no expectations of being 
punished will remain. The risk of punishment is thus no more, and the cost is thereby re-
moved. 
It might be thought that there are often reasonable disagreements on whether any 
particular instance of civil disobedience is justified, and even out of good faith the court can 
make mistakes and wrongfully punish justified civil disobedience. Thus, we can at most im-
perfectly follow the norm that civil disobedience, if justified, is not punished. Thus, there will 
always be false positives, and there will always be the risk of punishment. 
We can admit that there will always be the risk of punishment. However, the relevant 
consideration is how severe the risk is. The more the court can reliably identify justified in-
stances of civil disobedience, the lower the risk. If the court can generally successfully iden-
tify and refrain from punishing justified civil disobedience, even if occasionally there are 
some errors, the expectation of punishment may be too low for civil disobedience to serve as 
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a costly signal. On the other hand, if the court constantly judges justified civil disobedience 
as unjustified and proceeds to punish, the risk of punishment may indeed suffice for civil 
disobedience to serve as a costly social signal. However, we may question whether the prac-
tice of the court is just. Given that there are reasonable disagreements, the court ought to 
know that punishing what it sees as unjustified civil disobedience runs a significant risk of 
punishing those not liable to be punished. The more the court is committed to refraining from 
punishing those not liable to be punished, the more it will be reluctant to punish borderline 
cases. This tendency will again lower the risk of punishment, and undermine civil disobedi-
ence’s ability to serve as a costly social signal. Thus, the choice is again to run the risk of 
perpetrating injustice or to undermine civil disobedience. 
2.2.4 Costly without punishment: penalties 
Punishment may not be the appropriate response to civil disobedience. This is because, in 
part, as earlier argued, punishment necessarily conveys blame. This has led some to consider 
imposing penalties on civil disobedience instead (Lefkowitz 2007, 2018; W. Smith 2013).5 
There are many forms of penalties, e.g. temporary incarceration, community services, and, of 
course, fines. Here I will focus on the last possibility, as I don’t see how the first two can be 
remotely costly enough to allow civil disobedience to effectively serve as a costly signal. How-
ever, fines may seem to be a genuine possibility. David Lefkowitz (2018) writes, “fines must 
be set high enough to impose a genuine sacrifice for those who carry out acts of public diso-
bedience. At the same time, they should not be set so high that they discourage almost any 
protest at all” (277).6 How does this possibility fare? 
 
5 Some theorists argue that regardless of whether civil disobedience is justified, it ought not 
to be punished. Lefkowitz and Smith, as cited in the main text, however, argue that it is per-
missible to impose a fine on civil disobedients. I draw from this literature and consider 
whether fines can save civil disobedience. I will engage with the right to civil disobedience 
near the end of this paper. 
6 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility. 
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Similar to other forms of penalties, we may question whether fines can be sufficiently 
costly. A relatively low fine that can be easily paid off certainly doesn’t suffice. On the other 
hand, if the state imposes fines that are as costly as the punishment civil disobedience would 
otherwise incur, then the severity of the fine may make the imposition unjust. So here we face 
a practical difficulty: can we genuinely strike a balance? It may be possible, but here are four 
further obstacles against the very idea of fining civil disobedience. 
First, as previously mentioned, monetary costs may be burdensome to some, but near 
costless to the affluent. We may then worry that a fixed fine will in effect make civil disobe-
dience a luxury affordable only by the most advantaged. Lefkowitz (2018) indeed has consid-
ered this very possibility when defending fining civil disobedience, and proposes that “[t]his 
may require calculating fines as a percentage of an individual’s annual income or net worth” 
(fn. 9). A fine indexed to wealth or income may be a genuine possibility. However, it leaves us 
with two problems. First, we need a concrete policy proposal to evaluate the feasibility of this 
possibility. Second, and more importantly, associating civil disobedience with money will 
create additional complications, or so I shall argue. 
Second, fines can be crowdfunded. This by itself may be unproblematic. Incurring a 
fine through civil disobedience, but then being reimbursed by sympathetic citizens may 
simply show that one’s action is widely endorsed by the general public. However, the affluent 
may also singlehandedly sponsor many civil disobedients, or even hire mercenaries to diso-
bey. This will really mess up the reliability of the costly signals of fines. The willingness to 
incur a fine no longer indicates sincere moral convictions, because the fine can be easily paid 
off by someone who lacks the relevant sincerity and seriousness. The willingness to engage 
in civil disobedience may then become more an indicator of the ability to attract external 
funding. 
Third, fines may seem more a fee (Holmes Jr 2009), and we need to worry about what 
Michael Sandel (2012) calls “corruption:” putting price tags on things that were otherwise 
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good degrades or at least alters their value. With regard to civil disobedience, if it can be paid 
off, then it seems to be an act that is associated with monetary value. There is, then, a genuine 
risk that civil disobedience becomes a commodity. To be somewhat uncharitable, the serious 
act of engaging in civil disobedience is, at least from the perspective of a bystander, indistin-
guishable from paying to enter a theme park. This altered perception of civil disobedience 
may be one of the worst things that can happen to civil disobedients. 
Fourth, and perhaps because of the two previous concerns, the civil disobedient may 
refuse to pay the fine. The refusal to pay itself may even be a further act of civil disobedience, 
as it can be performed as a public act of protest. We will then need to spell out whether the 
refusal to pay is a justified act of civil disobedience. I contend that it can be. If the original 
act of civil disobedience was justified, and paying the fine would undermine the communi-
cative effort of civil disobedience, then the civil disobedient must refuse the fine. We need, 
then, decide whether we are to punish or penalise. The former is unjust. The latter leads us 
in circles. 
3. Leveraging injustice 
Civil disobedience is effective insofar as it serves as a costly signal, and can serve as a costly 
signal mainly because it is punished. However, punishing justified civil disobedience is mor-
ally unacceptable. Furthermore, by treating civil disobedience justly and refraining from pun-
ishing justified instances of civil disobedience, the state runs the risk of undermining the 
effectiveness of civil disobedience. We may have to conclude that this is an unfortunate and 
unavoidable consequence of adhering to the demands of justice. By spelling out this unfortu-
nate and unavoidable consequence, we may have also arrived at a position to better under-
stand civil disobedience and its paradoxical nature. 
Here, a key feature of civil disobedience is revealed. Distinct from other types of costly 
social signals such as hunger strikes and self-immolation, civil disobedience functions not 
only by attempting to highlight the fact that one has been treated unjustly through bearing 
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significant costs, but come to bear those costs through being unjustly punished. While it is 
uncontroversial that it is extremely unjust that some have to go through the suffering and 
pain of hunger strikes or self-immolation to bring forth their case, it is not clear that in virtue 
of being, for the lack of a better term, the object of hunger strikes or self-immolation, one 
suffers additional injustice. In these cases of self-harm, one is also the subject issuing the 
harm. In contrast, to be the object of unjust punishment is to suffer from additional injustice. 
But what’s astonishing about civil disobedience is that the additional injustice disobedients 
suffer fuels their communicative force, or to say, amplifies the volume of the “moral shout.” 
In short, justified civil disobedience leverages the punitive injustice it suffers into communi-
cative force. 
Of course, civil disobedience may not be unique in terms of leveraging injustice. When 
it comes to revolutions and nonviolent resistances, the prospects of success may increase 
when governments resort to indiscriminate violence. This is because indiscriminate violence 
sometimes helps rebels overcome a collective action problem on recruiting: not participating 
is normally safer than participating in a revolution, but when the government resorts to in-
discriminate violence, not participating is no longer safer; in contrast, given that the rebels 
may selectively provide protection and other resources, participating becomes more prudent 
than not participating (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Or it may be that indiscriminate violence 
sparks moral outrage that mobilizes otherwise apathetic citizens (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011; Smithey and Kurtz 2018). Regardless, leveraging injustice is nevertheless a distinctive 
feature of civil disobedience, and will lead to two paradoxical implications. 
The first is that the moral status of civil disobedience and of its punishment may be-
come unstable. Civil disobedience is illegal. Civil disobedience is disruptive, and imposes 
costs on others against their will. Civil disobedience may be justified despite these apparent 
wrong making features when a particular instance has a reasonable prospect of success, ei-
ther to bring about much needed social change or at least successfully raise awareness about 
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certain plights. When there’s no prospects of achieving either, there seems to be no clear way 
how civil disobedience can be justified, and engaging in civil disobedience is engaging in 
pointless wrongdoing. 
Not punishing civil disobedience debilitates civil disobedience, as it can no longer 
achieve anything through being a costly signal. Thus, in a society where it has been estab-
lished that justified civil disobedience is not to be punished, engaging in civil disobedience is 
wrong due to futility. Engaging in civil disobedience ceases to be admirable, regardless of 
how important and just the cause is. When there is no risk of any punishment, there is insig-
nificant self-sacrifice involved, and disobedients can no longer leverage injustice to boost 
their communicative force. Individuals who genuinely care about bringing forth social 
change may have to resort to something else, something that works. Here, civil disobedience 
is rendered misguided and simply wrong. 
However, and here’s the paradoxical part, once civil disobedience is rendered ineffec-
tive, misguided, and thus simply wrong, punishing civil disobedience no longer remains in-
disputably unjust. The state may still lack the moral standing to punish, but punishing futile 
civil disobedience would no longer be punishing those who have not engaged in wrongdoing. 
Thus, it may become permissible to punish civil disobedience, insofar as there is some way 
to circumvent the problem of standing, say by issuing the “guilty but civilly disobedient” 
(GBCD) verdict. By not punishing justified civil disobedience because the punishment would 
be unjust, the state can make it the case that punishing civil disobedience is no longer unjust, 
as the otherwise justified civil disobedience becomes futile and thus wrong. Thus, by adher-
ing to a requirement of justice, the state circumvents the requirement. 
However, once it is no longer unjust to punish civil disobedience, and should the state 
act accordingly and adopt a readiness to punish civil disobedience, the moral status of civil 
disobedience may alter yet again. Once the expectation of punishment is restored, civil diso-
bedience can again serve as a costly signal, and the effectiveness of civil disobedience is 
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restored. In scenarios where futility is the only factor that renders a particular instance of 
civil disobedience unjustified, that instance now becomes justified. Thus, the appropriate re-
sponse to an unjustified act of civil disobedience makes the otherwise unjustified act justi-
fied. 
However, once it is again justified to engage in civil disobedience, punishment be-
comes unjust. Adhering to the judgment that punishment becomes unjust, civil disobedience 
becomes unjustified, and then punishment becomes just, and adhering to that, civil disobe-
dience becomes justified, and so on and so forth. We thereby arrive at two instabilities: 
whether it is just to punish civil disobedience, and whether civil disobedience is justified. 
This is the first paradoxical implication of civil disobedience leveraging injustice, and it oc-
curs only and precisely when the state intends to adhere to the demand of justice regarding 
the punishment of civil disobedience. 
The major upshot of these instabilities is that under specific circumstances, the re-
quirements of justice may generate an impossibility. If, the state is to punish all unjustified 
civil disobedience, and refrain from punishing all justified civil disobedience, then when the 
only factor determining whether a particular instance of civil disobedience is justified is 
whether it is punished, the state is left with no acceptable course of action. It will either have 
to choose between punishing justified civil disobedience, which is made justified by punish-
ment, or not punishing unjustified civil disobedience, which is made unjustified by withhold-
ing punishment. This shows that intuitively plausible requirements of justice regarding pun-
ishing civil disobedience can’t jointly hold.7 
The second paradoxical implication is that by adhering to the requirement of justice 
with regard to punishing civil disobedience, the state makes room for more radical protests. 
This may be somewhat unexpected. It may be intuitive that when the state sinks lower on the 
 
7 Those who endorse a moral right to civil disobedience can avoid this impossibility, but at 
the cost of rendering all civil disobedience ineffective. This will make their account more 
vulnerable to the second paradoxical implication. 
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scales of justice, more radical measures are warranted. Rawls, for instance, acknowledges 
that if there were to be “outrageous violation of equal liberty, say by forbidding the religion 
of a weak and defenseless minority…even civil disobedience might be much too mild” (328). 
Furthermore, when the state improves its standing by adhering to more requirements of jus-
tice, it may regain its political legitimacy (Galoob and Winter 2019). In contrast, the thought 
that the state can turn drastic measures into appropriate options by adhering to certain re-
quirements of justice just seems incorrect.8 But here’s how. 
Recall that civil disobedience is called for when there are some nontrivial flaws in the 
system that need to be fixed. These flaws may include, as Rawls (1999) points out, severe 
violations of basic liberties or of fair and equal opportunity. Or they may include issues that 
spring from globalization (Markovits 2005), war, nuclear weapons, and the preservation of 
environmental goods (W. Smith 2011), and animal rights (Celikates 2016b), just to name a 
few. Civil disobedience serves as the appropriate response to these various issues when noth-
ing short of civil disobedience has reasonable prospects of solving them. What would happen 
if civil disobedience proves to be futile? 
There are a number of possibilities. The first possibility is that there’s an impasse. It 
is unfortunate that civil disobedience cannot solve whatever problem that needs to be solved, 
and it just happens that nothing else can do the job. This possibility is not particular inter-
esting. It’s just something unfortunate if it ever occurs.  
The second possibility is that there’s a moral impasse. That is to say, while there may 
be ways to achieve the same or similar goals, those ways are morally prohibited. Genuine 
moral impasses in other contexts include, for instance, when the only means that may 
 
8 It seems possible to argue that the state does not become more just merely by adhering to 
particular requirements of justice. Estlund (2019, Ch. 14) points out that piecemeal improve-
ments may sometimes lead to something worse, and to suppose that this is never the case 
commits what he calls “the fallacy of approximation.” This is compatible with my claim that 
the state can make uncivil disobedience permissible by adhering to a demand of justice, and 
the fallacy of approximation may help to make my claim more intuitive. 
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frustrate a minor unjust aggression is to resort to lethal force. To kill someone when that 
person is about to slap you on the face for no good reason is wrong even if killing is the only 
way to prevent being slapped on the face. This is because while slapping you on the face is 
morally wrong, the disvalue of killing even an unjust aggressor is disproportionate to the 
value promoted by preventing the slap. With regard to debilitating civil disobedience, it may 
be that while there are more drastic measures that can solve whatever that needs to be solved, 
none of them are morally permissible. I contend that this will not too often be the case, as 
more likely at least one of the following two possibilities may hold. 
Third, it may be that there are other costly signals one can adopt. There are different 
forms of self-harm, and some are extremely dramatic. Self-immolation as a form of protest 
has been adopted in various regions including Vietnam (Murray Yang 2011), Tibet (Whalen-
Bridge 2015), and Australia’s refugee camps in Nauru.9 I am not suggesting that costly signals 
in the form of self-harm are always effective. Instead, I am merely suggesting that they may 
sometimes be as effective as certain instances of civil disobedience in terms of speaking in 
ways individuals without the relevant sincerity and seriousness are unwilling to speak. In 
addition, I am not suggesting that this is in any way a good option. It is extremely unfortunate 
that the oppressed sometimes can only voice their concerns by bearing extreme costs. Should 
there be other available options, those options would most likely be preferable. Being too 
ready to encourage self-immolation as if it were fireworks is irresponsible if not outright evil. 
The fourth possibility is that activities that fall short of civil disobedience may become 
morally permissible. Civil disobedience, if available, is permissible if the injustice it aims to 
address is severe enough, and furthermore when it is the last resort in the sense that legal 
channels prove to be futile or unable to respond in time. More simply, civil disobedience is 
permissible when proportionate and necessary. Now, if civil disobedience is rendered futile, 
 
9 Doherty, B. & Davidson, H. (3 May 2016). Self-immolation: desperate protests against Aus-
tralia's detention regime. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2016/may/03/asylum-seekers-set-themselves-alight-nauru 
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it is natural to ask what else works, and whether those options that work fall within the 
boundaries of proportionality. These options, if they genuinely exist, first, will not depend on 
being punished for their effectiveness, and second, may consist in flouting one or several 
norms of civil disobedience by being “covert, evasive, anonymous, violent, or deliberately of-
fensive” (Delmas 2018: 17), and may be rightly labeled uncivil disobedience. To determine 
whether such activities are proportionate, we need to see how much costs or harms they in-
flict on others, how severe the injustice they aim to prevent is. I admit that it is not impossible 
that the severity of the injustice in question just happens to be severe enough to make civil 
disobedience proportionate but anything beyond civil disobedience disproportionate. It may 
be possible, but highly unlikely: it would be an odd coincident that all sorts of different pos-
sible injustices that can be fixed by justified civil disobedience are all unjust to the exact same 
degree. Furthermore, consider the injustices civil disobedience has targeted in the past and 
are aiming to fix now: racial segregation, disenfranchisement, extreme social and economic 
inequality, and the climate crisis, just to name a few. Given the scale and severity of these 
issues, one may rightly wonder why nothing beyond civil disobedience can ever be permissi-
ble.10 
In sum, a core feature of civil disobedience is that it functions primarily by leveraging 
injustice. This core feature leads to two unexpected and even paradoxical implications. First, 
the moral status of civil disobedience and its punishment becomes unstable insofar as the 
state intends to punish all and only the instances of unjustified civil disobedience. This leads 
to an impossibility where under specific circumstances, simply no course of action with re-
gard to punishing civil disobedience is morally acceptable. Second, the state’s reaction to civil 
disobedience may create room for uncivil disobedience. This can happen not just when the 
 
10 Some may be tempted to insist that activities that fall short of the standards of civil diso-
bedience is never permissible. However, given that arguments have been made on how un-
civil disobedience can be justified (see, for example Delmas 2018; Lai 2019), one may need to 
show how all arguments for uncivil disobedience fail to maintain this categorical ban on un-
civil disobedience. 
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state responds unjustly and harshly to civil disobedience, but also when the state adheres to 
a demand of justice and refuses to punish civil disobedience. In the latter case, by rendering 
civil disobedience futile, the state makes other options potentially justifiable. 
4. The “irrespectability” of the right to civil disobedience 
Some support a right to civil disobedience. Brownlee (2012), for instance, holds that this right 
is grounded on one’s right to conscience. She further argues that in virtue of possessing this 
right, the state has a duty to refrain from interfering with civil disobedience. This duty implies 
that neither punishment nor penalties are morally acceptable, as either violates the right to 
civil disobedience. In contrast, Lefkowitz (2007, 2018) argues that civil disobedience ought 
not to be punished, but may be permissibly penalized. This is, in part, to ensure that civil 
disobedience isn’t carried out frivolously. William Smith (2013) further points out an im-
portant reason to issue the fine: it indicates the state’s acknowledgment that civil disobedi-
ence has been engaged in. I do not intend to weigh in. Instead, I will simply spell out a trou-
blesome implication my costly signal account has on this right. 
Now, I have already argued that there are substantial obstacles against fining civil 
disobedience (in 2.2.4). Whether these obstacles can be overcome depends on whether feasi-
ble concrete options are proposed in the future, but without actually seeing these proposals, 
I think it better to set aside the possibility of fines, at least for the moment. So, we are again 
left with two options, to punish, or not to punish civil disobedience. If there indeed is a right 
to civil disobedience, then punishing civil disobedience is unjust, as it fails to respect this 
right. However, if my account of costly signals is plausible, then not punishing civil disobe-
dience also fails to respect the right to civil disobedience: in virtue of not punishing, the state 
undermines civil disobedience, and makes the possession of this right utterly meaningless. 
In short, neither punishing nor not punishing civil disobedience respects the right to civil 
disobedience. If the right to civil disobedience is a genuine right, then, it is an “irrespectable” 
right. Regardless of what the state does, it fails to respect that right. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that punishing justified civil disobedience is unjust. It goes against all the plau-
sible ends of punishment, and there’s nothing special about civil disobedience that makes 
punishing justified civil disobedience morally unproblematic. However, should we follow this 
requirement of justice and refrain from punishing justified civil disobedience, we will create 
an unfortunate consequence: civil disobedience is rendered futile. This is because civil diso-
bedience is most effective as a costly social signal, and it is costly through being punished. 
Through understanding the unjust nature of punishing justified civil disobedience, we arrive 
at a better understanding of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injus-
tice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This fact points us to two paradoxical 
implications: first, the moral status of civil disobedience and its punishment may become 
unstable, and the attempt to refrain from punishing all and only all justified civil disobedi-
ence undermines itself by generating an impossibility; second by adhering to a demand of 
justice, namely, not punishing justified civil disobedience, the state can create room for un-
civil disobedience. 
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